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Abstract
Background: The sustainability of long-term care (LTC) is a prominent policy priority in many Western 
countries. LTC is one of the most pressing fiscal issues for the growing population of elderly people in the 
European Union (EU) Member States. Country recommendations regarding LTC are prominent under the 
EU’s European Semester.
Methods: This paper examines challenges related to the financial- and organizational sustainability of LTC 
systems in the EU. We combined a targeted literature review and a descriptive selected country analysis of: 
(1) public- and private funding; (2) informal care and externalities; and (3) the possible role of technology in 
increasing productivity. Countries were selected via purposive sampling to establish a cohort of country cases 
covering the spectrum of differences in LTC systems: public spending, private funding, informal care use, 
informal care support, and cash benefits. 
Results: The aging of the population, the increasing gap between availability of informal care and demand for 
LTC, substantial market failures of private funding for LTC, and fiscal imbalances in some countries, have led 
to structural reforms and enduring pressures for LTC policy-makers across the EU. Our exploration of national 
policies illustrates different solutions that attempt to promote fairness while stimulating efficient delivery of 
services. Important steps must be taken to address the sustainability of LTC. First, countries should look deeper 
into the possibilities of complementing public- and private funding, as well as at addressing market failures of 
private funding. Second, informal care externalities with spill-over into neighboring policy areas, the labor 
force, and formal LTC workers, should be properly addressed. Thirdly, innovations in LTC services should be 
stimulated to increase productivity through technology and process innovations, and to reduce costs. 
Conclusion: The analysis shows why it is difficult for EU Member State governments to meet all their goals for 
sustainable LTC, given the demographic- and fiscal circumstances, and the complexities of LTC systems. It also 
shows the usefulness to learn from policy design and implementation of LTC policy in other countries, within 
and outside the EU. Researchers can contribute by studying conditions, under which the strategies explored 
might deliver solutions for policy-makers.
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Implications for policy makers
• Private long-term care (LTC) insurance only offers a partial solution for a minority of the population, and European Union (EU) countries 
should consider complementing public- and private funding of LTC, and addressing the market failures of private funding.
• Informal care is an essential cornerstone of sustainable LTC, but it faces many challenges related to care allowances, attendance allowances 
(ALs), and opportunity costs for predominantly female informal care workers. If the supply of informal care cannot be sustained, formal elderly 
care systems will sustain greater fiscal imbalances. 
• Increasing LTC productivity through technology is a major challenge. Innovations to increase the efficiency of LTC services should be 
stimulated, especially if they coincide with lower costs.
Implications for the public
Long-term care (LTC) for elderly and chronically ill people is becoming more and more expensive due to the growing population of elderly people. 
In addition, a shortage of professional workers may become a problem. A solution that contributes to sustainable LTC is to more strongly support 
informal care by family or friends.
Key Messages 
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Background
The sustainability of long-term care (LTC) is currently a 
prominent policy priority in many European Union (EU) 
countries. LTC for the growing population of elderly people 
is one of the most pressing fiscal issues in EU Member 
States. The European Commission estimates that public 
LTC expenditures will increase from 1.6% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2013 to 2.7% by 2060.1 Rising expectations 
of the ‘baby boom generation’ around service provision add to 
the fiscal pressure. The European Semester is the EU’s annual 
cycle of economic policy guidance and surveillance, with 
country recommendations. Following the 2014 Semester, 
country-specific recommendations regarding LTC have 
become the focus of EU policy.2
Policies addressing financial sustainability in health generally 
depend either on increasing private funding (eg, limiting 
entitlements or increasing out-of-pocket payments) or 
increasing productivity growth and reducing unit costs. 
These options come with puzzling policy problems. First, 
many LTC systems depend substantially on informal care.3 
Private payments also cover substantial amounts of care for 
the elderly. Second, increasing productivity might be difficult 
due to LTC’s dependence on high labor inputs, the so-called 
Baumol Effect.4
Private funding in LTC implies out-of-pocket payments 
and other private funding arrangements. However, such 
arrangements may have serious, unintended consequences 
and are often inaccessible to people with lower incomes. 
In effect, it might mean that consumers become more 
dependent on informal caregivers. A growing informal care 
gap will then emerge, as the demand for informal care is 
expected to increase faster than its supply.3 Externalities of 
informal care on caregivers’ health and employment – in the 
form of opportunity costs or forgone wages – can be quite 
significant. Labor immigration from new EU Member States 
and developing countries could fill this gap, but can lead to 
problems, such as a gray labor market, which is visible in 
countries with fewer formal LTC entitlements.3
Policy-makers, who wish to avoid such options, are dependent 
upon policies that substantially increase productivity growth 
and reduce unit costs. However, most LTC services are labor-
intensive and significant productivity improvements are hard 
to achieve. In some countries, policies focus on increasing 
competition and marketization in LTC.5 LTC might also 
benefit from a greater use of technology or process innovations 
to achieve productivity gains. A much sought-after solution is 
to increase efficiency by reducing expensive institutional stays 
and substituting these with low-cost home care.3 
This paper examines the challenges of LTC systems in the EU, 
with the aim of identifying potential mechanisms for policy-
makers to enhance sustainability. We combined a targeted 
review of the literature with a descriptive analysis of selected 
EU countries. The analysis describes public- and private 
funding, informal care, and possible productivity gains from 
new technology and process innovations in LTC. For each of 
these issues, we present country-specific cases and policies to 
show and compare different approaches towards addressing 
the long-term sustainability of LTC. We also explore avenues 
for future policy. This can contribute to the development of a 
grounded framework for analyzing sustainability in LTC.
Methods
Literature Review
We reviewed the literature to: (a) find studies that compared 
LTC systems; (b) identify policy measures for LTC 
sustainability, and (c) study the impact of policy measures on 
LTC sustainability. We performed a targeted literature search 
in PubMed and Google Scholar to find both peer-reviewed 
publications and gray literature (eg, reports by governments, 
independent organizations). We used combinations of 
the following search terms: long-term care, long-term-
care financing, informal care, formal care, workforce, 
public funding, private funding, financial sustainability, 
organizational sustainability, aging, substitution, productivity, 
marketization, and competition. In addition, we hand-
searched identified publications for relevant references and 
websites of policy institutions. 
The literature review led us to formulate three important 
policy challenges for EU countries: (1) how should public 
and private funding of LTC be combined to guarantee fiscal 
sustainability in the long run; (2) how should the increasing 
gap in the availability of informal care and the externalities (ie, 
‘spill-over effects’) on caregivers be addressed; and (3) how 
can LTC productivity be improved. We, therefore, focused on 
descriptive selected country analysis related to: (1) public- 
and private funding; (2) informal care and externalities; and 
(3) the possible role of technology and process innovation in 
increasing productivity.
Country Selection
LTC systems differ greatly between EU countries. We selected 
Belgium, England, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, to 
cover most of the differences between healthcare systems in 
the EU. There is a lot of variety in public spending, private 
funding, informal care use, informal care support, and cash 
benefits.6 This hinders sampling according to the principle 
of health systems that are most similar in terms of certain 
critical variables. Using broadly collected indicators of LTC 
requirements — such as the percentage of the population 
over the age of 80, the percentage of adults over the age of 65 
with strong limitations in daily activities, or the prevalence of 
dementia  — only increases the large inter-country diversity.7 
Public expenditures for LTC also vary greatly between 
countries. Such evidence adds up to the fact that LTC systems 
are very much embedded in national systems that have 
followed their own path dependency. 
We searched for countries that differ in important aspects 
of their health systems to provide a variety of case examples. 
England is widely recognized as the archetypal National 
Health Service (NHS) system, while Italy has a decentralized 
NHS, as well as a more corporatist culture. France has a single 
insurer Bismarck system, while Belgium relies on multiple 
insurers. Over the past decade, the Netherlands has evolved 
from a Bismarck country, toward a more market-based model. 
Results
Table 1 provides detailed insights on public- and private 
funding and coverage for LTC.
Public expenditure on LTC, as a percentage of GDP in 2010, 
ranged from 1.2% to 4.1% in these countries. Funding systems 
also varied considerably. The weighted percentage of elderly 
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Table 1. Financing and Coverage
Belgium England France Italy The Netherlands
Public expenditure on 
LTC as a percentage of 
GDP (2013)
2.1% 1.2% 2.0% 1.8% 4.1%
Eligibility for coverage
Universal coverage within a single system 
(health-related and personal care).
Social care (domestic care and other support) 
is a regional responsibility
Mixed: means-tested social care system 
with universal benefits for disability
Mixed system Mixed system
Universal coverage 
within a single system 
(until 2015)
Coverage programs
Via the health system, a federal program, 
Flemish and regional programs
Means-tested, safety net (adult social 
care) and universal benefits (DLA and 
AL)
Income-related benefits (Said, APA)
Parallel universal scheme 
(institutional care [RSA] as 
part of the health system and 
care allowances [IA])
Public LTC insurance 
model – social insurance 
(Long-Term Care Act)
Private LTC insurance 
availability and type
Complementary mutual health insurance 
(reimbursement policies)
Life annuities are offered.
Less than 0.05% of people aged 40+ 
hold a private insurance policy
Mainly indemnity policies: 15% of people 
aged 40+ hold a private insurance policy
Indemnity policies No
Policies to increase 
the level of private 
insurance
No No
Group insurance policies are offered.
LTC insurance policies are offered as part of 
life insurance policies
No No
Abbreviations: LTC, long-term care; GDP, gross domestic product; DLA, disability living allowance; AL, attendance allowance; RSA, Residenze Sanitarie Assistenziali; IA, indennità di accompagnamento. 
Source: OECD Health Data8; Colombo et al3; ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, based on SHARE wave II, and different country reports.9
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people using personal care by informal caregivers ranged 
from 3.2% to 14.6% in our country sample.3
Public- and Private Funding
A recurring question for many countries is: How to fund LTC 
in the long run? A key aspect of this challenge is the balance 
between public- and private funding. Aging of the populations 
and the increasing financial pressures on national budgets 
are spurring countries to look for alternatives to fund LTC. 
Thus, there is a growing interest in the potential role of private 
funding. 
There are essentially two ways to increase private funding. 
The first way is to increase the direct financial contributions 
of consumers (eg, via means testing, savings, or reverse 
mortgages). Since pensions are generally lower than wages, 
and there is a highly skewed actual distribution of wealth, 
substantial numbers of care seekers will not be able to fall 
back on such sources. The second way is to create a market 
for private LTC insurance. We illustrate the problems of 
means testing and private insurance coverage by exploring the 
current experiences of England and France.
Means Testing
In England, universal coverage aims to protect people, who 
incur very high LTC costs. Towards this aim, England relies 
on means testing for public funding of LTC. Patients from 
lower income households are granted higher subsidies. Only 
individuals with income and assets below the means-tested 
level receive publicly funded social care. The system also 
directs services toward those who live alone and who do not 
receive informal care.10 Individuals’ LTC needs are assessed by 
the social service departments of local authorities. Under the 
current system (2013), people with assets (savings and capital) 
above £23 250 are not eligible for local authority support and 
must pay their costs privately. Individuals with assets below 
the threshold are financially supported by the State, although 
they are required to pay a share of the costs of their care.11 
The means-testing policy suggests that elderly citizens with 
moderate means face the risk of extremely high LTC costs.
In 2011, the Dilnot Commission proposed increasing the 
threshold for residential care and capping the lifetime care 
costs people face.12 Based on these recommendations, the 
English Government set the upper threshold for means 
testing in residential care to £118 000. Moreover, a cap of 
£72 000 on the total amount of costs for eligible care and 
support needs was recommended.13 The higher cap increases 
the affordability of LTC for middle-income people, but still 
fails to protect a substantial share of elderly people against 
significant costs. According to the plan, the new system was 
to become effective in April 2016.14 However, the necessary 
allocated funds were reshuffled to fight the acute funding 
gaps in social care, and the plan has been deferred to 2020. 
In conclusion, by aiming to offer comprehensive services to 
people with lower incomes, the English system fails to prevent 
high fiscal burdens for the middle class, due to extremely high 
private costs.
Private Insurance 
While private funding has attracted considerable interest 
in recent years, the private LTC insurance market has not 
yet gained a large role. Recent figures show that — except 
in the United States15 and France16 — private insurance 
accounts for less than 2% of total LTC spending.3 With 
public funding coming under pressure, there is an interest 
in better understanding how private insurance mechanisms 
could complement public coverage. Below, we discuss several 
reasons (ie, market failures) for the low uptake of LTC 
insurance. 
On the demand side, limited consumer rationality or 
individual ‘myopia’ may play a role. Research shows that 
individuals find it difficult to understand low-probability 
high-loss events such as LTC. Moreover, the existence of 
public LTC insurance, the availability of public support, and 
the possibility of informal care can distort an individual’s 
willingness to obtain private insurance. 
It can also be considered rational to not buy LTC insurance. 
Pauly17 explained this rationality by noting that LTC 
insurance would substitute formal care for preferred informal 
care by neighbors, family members, or the community. This 
argument however, was objected to by Cramer and Jensen,18 
who found that income stood out in predicting purchase of 
LTC insurance in the United States. In France, purchase is 
partly motivated by a desire to protect family members from 
having to provide care.19 
Adverse selection and moral hazard certainly play a role, 
as insurers may limit eligibility for private LTC insurance 
to individuals without pre-existing conditions, or set high, 
risk-adjusted prices. Another barrier to purchasing private 
LTC insurance is the competing financial obligations that 
individuals and families may face. Low-income households 
simply cannot afford private coverage. Brown and Finkelstein20 
empirically showed that in the United States, LTC policy 
premiums are substantially higher than the expected benefits, 
which reduces monetary value for policy holders. On the 
supply side, market functions may be impaired by the insurers’ 
limited ability to control the covered LTC risk, because of 
future uncertainty and limited competition. This, in turn, can 
lead to premium volatility. To guarantee the insurers’ financial 
viability, premiums are subject to higher prices, if the risk 
pool of insured increases. 
In France, the popularity of private LTC insurance steadily 
grew in the early 2000s, until in 2012 it covered 11% of the 
adult French population.16 French private LTC insurers offer 
a variety of products that may be purchased individually or 
collectively. Policies tend to be cheap, but also to offer low 
benefits. Individual policies cost €345 on average in 2010, 
whereas average monthly payouts equaled €540. Employer-
based polices cost €74 annually on average, and monthly 
payouts equaled €150. Due to these limited benefits, in case 
of dependency, people with LTC still depend on ‘safety-net 
programs’ or must pay the majority of costs privately. French 
people with pre-existing conditions are often exempted from 
insurance.16,21 In 2001, the growth rate in the number of 
insurance contracts in France reached 22%, mainly because 
insurers started marketing or cross-selling their products. The 
growth rate declined in 2006, after the French Government 
announced its intention to reform LTC insurance.22
In addition, almost 75% of French LTC insurance contracts 
were purchased under a group insurance plan.16 Group 
insurance offers several advantages, including the mitigation 
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of adverse selection. Risks are spread over a large group, which 
allows for better accessibility, fewer exclusions, and greater 
negotiation power for insurers vis-à-vis providers. On the 
other hand, since most group contracts are employer-based, 
they also limit the availability of LTC insurance for people who 
are not currently working. The French Government attempts 
to increase individual financial flexibility by combining LTC 
insurance with other financial products.23 The program 
vente en viager, for example, combines the sale of an elderly 
person’s home with their right to live in it (or receive rent) 
until their death.24 Such reverse mortgage products, however, 
are highly sensitive to fluctuations in housing prices. They 
work well when house prices increase, but can have dramatic 
consequences when they fall.25
Nevertheless, the French experience shows that it is possible 
to build a significant, private market. However, the case also 
illustrates that LTC insurance forms only a partial solution for 
a minority of the population and requires complementation. 
Informal Care and Externalities
Informal care forms the backbone of LTC and is, thus, the 
natural alternative when formal arrangements come under 
fiscal pressure. Informal care provides several benefits. First, 
the availability of informal care can allow people to remain 
(or, at least, remain longer) in their homes. This might have 
positive consequences for individual well-being and can be 
emotionally beneficial. Second, by staying at home longer, LTC 
costs might be lower than if the person were institutionalized. 
There is, therefore, a trend to invest public resources into 
personal budgets or cash benefits for LTC and/or to allow 
some tax benefits for informal caregivers or those receiving 
LTC.3 Apart from stimulating informal care, cash benefits 
may serve a wide number of policy goals, such as income 
support for carers, to provide recipients more control on the 
care they receive (in choosing the service they need, from 
their preferred providers, according to their own conditions), 
to stimulate (an underdeveloped) formal workforce, or 
to increase allocative efficiency of the system. Below, we 
primarily discuss cash benefits as a means of stimulating 
informal care, since our article focuses on fiscal sustainability, 
and monetizing informal care adds to the public purse, and 
we report on other potential goals, if applicable. 
Table 2 shows that each of the selected countries adopted some 
policy measures for supporting informal caregivers. However, 
scale and scope are limited. This is supported by Triantafillou 
et al,26 who concluded that the basket of relevant services to 
empower caregivers by enhancing skills and knowledge is not 
highly developed. Moreover, knowledge about informal care 
support is very limited, especially concerning effectiveness 
on mitigating adverse effects of caring on work and health 
(mental and physical).3 Courtin et al27 also reported that EU 
policies are at an early stage of development. They showed 
that various policies have been implemented in EU countries: 
financial support is the most common, followed by respite 
care and training. Moreover, most EU countries do not 
systematically identify informal caregivers, or assess their 
needs.27
The ratio of available informal care workers — predominantly 
female family members — to care seekers is diminishing in 
many countries.3 This is caused by a decrease in the share of 
the working-age population and a number of societal changes 
(eg, declining family size, decreased co-residence of elderly 
people with their children, higher divorce rates, greater female 
labor market participation, increased retirement age, and a 
possible decline in the willingness to care).3 This is especially 
the case for people with higher incomes, as they have larger 
opportunity costs. 
There are also disadvantages for the caregivers. Career 
interruptions become frequent when one has to look after 
someone else, which leads to a deterioration of human capital 
or simply fewer opportunities for a better career.3 In addition 
to such financial losses, a large body of research has found 
that care giving has negative effects on health. Psychological 
distress, isolation, and lack of support, are drivers in the 
worsening mental health of informal caregivers, particularly 
when intensive and co-residential care is provided.28,29 There is 
less evidence available on the detrimental effects of providing 
less intensive care on mental health. These negative effects on 
the caregiver also seem to differ across countries.3,30
Formal- and informal care can be considered substitutes 
or complements, depending upon the type of care and the 
person’s needs. Care responsibilities that depend on a higher 
level of education generally require more formal workers. 
Bolin et al31 consider informal care to be a substitute for 
formal care in domestic help, and complementary to nursing 
care. There is also evidence that suggests that personal care 
may be substituted for informal care.32,33 The policy in many 
countries is aimed at shifting institutional care towards a 
combination of formal- and informal care for people living 
at home. 
For instance, over the last decade, Belgium has implemented 
several arrangements to stimulate older people to live 
independently at home for as long as possible, while 
guaranteeing access to affordable formal care services. 
Arrangements are aimed at shifting residential LTC from low-
care to high-care dependents, and include the establishment 
of alternative types of care to support home care (including 
nursing care). These reforms have resulted in a relative shift 
toward living at home, rather than in nursing homes, with 
a 30% increase in home care and only a limited increase in 
nursing care (11%). In addition, the supply of semi-residential 
services, such as day-care centers and short-stay centers, has 
increased.34-36 However, despite these measures to reduce 
residential care and stimulate home care, the number of 
residential care users is projected to further increase due to 
the aging of the Belgian population.35 
Several countries rely on multiple measures to support the 
work of informal caregivers, to mitigate the adverse effects 
of informal care on work and health, and to acknowledge 
their important contribution to overall LTC. Cash benefits 
are either financial measures paid directly to the carer to 
help sustain their ability to provide care, or cash benefits are 
given to the care recipient, wherein recipients are stimulated 
to choose the care they need and/or to give control on the 
care they receive. Other supporting arrangements that may 
support informal workers – but not always exclusively aimed 
at the informal worker – include respite care; tax benefits; 
home-based, professional, formal services; home support 
devices; home adaptations; paid- or unpaid leave; counseling 
and training services; and information and coordination 
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Table 2. Informal Care Support
Belgium England France Italy The Netherlands
Allowance to caregiver
Care premium (mantelzorgpremie). 
Eligibility criteria and payment 
conditions vary
Caregiver’s allowance for 
those spending at least 35 
hours per week providing 
care
No No No
Allowance to recipient
Integration allowance; income and 
needs tested
Al, for those who need care 
for more than six months
Personal allowance (Allocation 
Personnalisée à l’autonomie) for people 
aged 60+, depending on disability and 
income
AL, needs tested
Personal budget, no age limit or income test 
to claim
Tax support No No
Planned tax reductions for hiring formal 
labor
No No
Paid leave
Palliative care leave up to two months 
and medical assistance leave up to 12 
months. Time credit one to five years
No
Family solidarity leave for three months. 
For first-degree relatives or terminally ill 
co-residential member
Unknown
Leave for care up to 10 days, employers can 
refuse on serious business grounds. Paid 
70% of earnings
Unpaid leave
Emergency leave: 10 days in private 
sector and 45 days in public sector
Emergency leave to care 
for a family member. 
The length should be 
reasonable (ie, 2 days)
Family support leave for three months Unknown
50% of the number of hours worked, for 12 
weeks in one or several periods
Policies to stimulate 
caregivers’ physical- and 
mental well-being
Training/education, respite care, and 
counseling
Training/education, respite 
care, and counseling
Training/education, respite care, and 
counseling
Unknown
Training/education, respite care, and 
counseling (such as the POM method: 
preventive counseling and support)
Abbreviations: POM, reventieve Ondersteuning Matelzorgers; AL, attendance allowance.
Source: OECD Health Data8; Colombo et al3; ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, based on SHARE wave II, and different country reports.9
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services.
It is quite complicated to set the amount of a care allowance. 
Usually, the income level for care allowances is fairly low, as 
‘market level’ amounts would compete with other forms of 
employment.26 In particular, caregivers with little education, 
who experience difficulties in entering the labor market, could 
be discouraged to look for a job outside the house. From this 
perspective, care allowances might appear to be instruments 
that grant some form of income assistance, while maintaining 
care giving as a low-profile and low-paid job.3 
In England, pilot studies have found tension between 
competition, market stability, choice, and (female) caregivers’ 
roles. For example, systems with health insurance brokers 
resulted in increased costs and care delays, and local 
authorities placed only a few home care providers on their 
framework agreement. In addition, many elderly people may 
not want to act as empowered consumers of care.37 However, 
an earlier study found that individual budgets can have 
positive effects on caregivers (who are predominantly female). 
These caregivers reported an increased quality of life, were 
more likely to be fully occupied in activities of their choice, 
and were more likely to have social lives. Individual budgets, 
thus, provided choice, and, as such, recognized caregivers’ 
rights and support needs.38 Other literature shows that LTC 
coverage expansions go ‘hand-in-hand’ with increased cost 
sharing by families and subsidization of informal care by 
families. As such, the implicit partnership of cost sharing and 
incentivizing family care giving may serve as a catalyst for 
coverage expansion.39
The administrative burden of supporting informal care may 
be considerable, but fiscal stress necessitates administrative 
control and monitoring. In terms of administrative tasks, 
it is difficult to monitor several requirements, such as 
identification of an eligible caregiver, ensuring the necessary 
care effort, and maintaining the relationship. Moreover, in the 
absence of regulation, care allowances may encourage black 
markets.40 Fiscal sustainability is at stake in many countries, 
including France and the Netherlands. Germany is one of 
the countries that has been most successful in maintaining 
fiscal sustainability by using a reliable and strict assessment 
process. Its flexible policy also allows officials to make minor 
adjustments (such as increasing contribution rates).40
In contrast, attendance allowances (ALs) have several 
advantages for policy-makers. First, cash benefits can be 
used to increase the autonomy of care recipients by allowing 
flexibility in organizing the type of care people want. 
Second, the eligibility requirements are more clear-cut than 
care allowances. Cash benefits or vouchers are provided 
to individuals, who have undergone an assessment. Third, 
cash benefits can be used to control costs, as the value of 
the benefit is usually set below the cost of in-kind services. 
However, the effects on cost control are heavily dependent 
upon the eligibility criteria for cash benefits and the way that 
the system is designed. In the Netherlands, the introduction 
of potentially very high cash benefits for a broad group of 
older- and handicapped individuals has increased the total 
cost of LTC, whereas England, France, and Italy, did not have 
these problems with their systems of cash benefits. Some 
studies from the Netherlands show that the allowances tend 
to appeal to a group of people who would have not applied for 
care (in-kind) if they had not had the option of having their 
own budget.41
In 1995, the Netherlands started to offer personal budgets for 
people entitled to LTC. Compared to many other countries, 
the eligibility criteria were quite generous. For example, they 
included people who needed only home help, because of 
their limitations, or a few hours of help every week towards 
organizing their lives. The amount of the personal budget was 
aligned with the costs of in-kind care. Initially, the reimbursed 
level was set at 70% of the formal rate of LTC. Thus, recipients 
could be eligible for benefits that equaled tens of thousands 
of Euros each year, or even more in severe cases. Patients 
value the personal budgets as an effective means to purchase 
and organize care. A tenfold growth in the number of budget 
holders led to an average 23% yearly cost increase (up to €2.2 
billion in 2010).42 
A considerable part of the personal budgets turned out to 
be used for complementary services and not so much for 
substitution of care in-kind. Increased uptake has largely 
been for the benefit of children and adolescents with learning 
disabilities, autistic spectrum diagnoses and intellectual 
disabilities, who previously received informal (unpaid) 
care.42 To counteract the problem of an exploding demand 
for personal budgets, stricter needs assessment protocols 
were implemented.43 In 2015, a major reform of the Dutch 
LTC system took place.44 The Dutch Government chose 
to maintain the option of cash benefits for all categories of 
care recipients, but stricter criteria were introduced and cash 
benefits are no longer transferred to the bank account of the 
budget holders; instead they received the right to purchase 
care that is paid by a third party. Reimbursement levels – 
relative to in-kind services - may vary, but are required to be 
sufficient for purchasing care.45
 In stark contrast to the Netherlands, the LTC system in England 
is a ‘safety-net’ type of system, in which publicly funded care 
is only available for those with serious care needs and low 
incomes who cannot afford to pay for the care themselves.10 
This restricts the group of individuals potentially entitled to 
cash benefits, such as direct payments and individual budgets. 
Both direct payments and personal budgets were primarily 
aimed at care recipients purchasing their own care. In 2007, 
the number of personal budget holders was about three times 
larger in the Netherlands than in England, despite the much 
smaller population of the Netherlands.41 Holders of direct 
payments appeared to have control and choice in organizing 
their care compared to personal budget holders.37
The French ‘cash-for-care’ scheme — ‘Allocation personnalisée 
d’autonomie’ (APA) — is strictly regulated.46 The cash benefits 
are aimed at people 60 years of age and older with a medium- 
to high level of dependency. The maximum allowance for the 
highest level of dependency was €1261 per month in 2012. 
The benefit must be spent according to a care plan developed 
by professionals employed by the French local authority. Due 
to income-dependent co-payments, APA recipients with a 
higher income fund a large part of the care plan themselves.
In Italy, cash benefits or companion payments (‘Indennità di 
accompagnamento’) are given to individuals. However, these 
individuals must be 100% disabled, must not be self-sufficient, 
and must not reside in an institution. All users receive the 
same amount of benefits, and each user may spend €487 per 
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month on whatever he or she wants. Many recipients use the 
companion payment to pay migrant care workers who provide 
care.47 Vouchers are also used to buy healthcare services, 
either from an accredited provider (in some regions in Italy) 
or directly. Personal budgets also fall into this category. Care 
recipients can use the cash to pay an informal caregiver. The 
use of the cash benefit scheme increased by 75% in the last 
decade, while the number of home care users rose by 23%, 
and the number of residential care users remained stable. 
Currently, public expenditure on cash benefits (0.56% GDP) 
equals the sum of both expenditure on in-kind home services 
(0.25% GDP) and residential care (0.31% GDP).3,47
The cases of England, France, Italy, and the Netherlands 
have important differences with potential impacts for further 
policy. The cash benefits in England, France, and Italy aim to 
provide extra financial support in LTC systems characterized 
by low public spending and intensive informal care. As such, 
the benefits protect those in greatest need from catastrophic 
costs. On the contrary, the main purpose of personal budgets 
in the Netherlands was to improve the autonomy of patients 
— including those with less severe needs — in an already very 
accessible system, with high public spending and a large role 
of formal care. The personal budget system was also aimed at 
increasing providers’ responsiveness to patients’ needs (as was 
the case in England and elsewhere). Policy-makers realized at 
the time of implementation that the cash benefits might be 
used to pay informal caregivers, who already supported the 
budget holders. The Dutch approach aimed at increasing the 
quality of care in a highly accessible system, even for those 
with lower needs.
In conclusion, from a financial sustainability point of view, 
while the English, Italian, and French systems seem to work 
for creating additional capacity in a stretched LTC system at 
comparatively low costs, the Dutch personal budgets simply 
seem to pay for informal care that was already given without 
payment, or to add complementary services on top of a broad 
level of entitlements for a considerable amount of additional 
spending. Finally, the relatively low uptake and development 
of non-allowance policies, such as respite care and training, 
suggests ample opportunity for improvement. Nevertheless, 
opportunity costs for informal care providers are important 
in considering further policy stimulating informal care.48
Productivity Gains
LTC is sensitive to the Baumol Effect, with wages rising in 
line with the general economy, even though LTC does not 
achieve significant productivity gains. This results in an 
increase in costs for a given level of output.4 The combination 
of population aging, lower productivity gains than the rest 
of the economy, and the greater labor intensity of LTC, 
raises the question of how to handle the long-term financial 
sustainability of LTC. One possibility would be to benefit 
from a greater use of technology or process innovations. 
Evidence across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries shows that there is 
more potential for using technology (especially information 
technology) in LTC. Mori et al49 distinguished between two 
general classes of available technological solutions: devices 
and aids, and ICT. Such solutions enable increased patient 
engagement and self-management by promoting citizens’ 
abilities to effectively manage their own health. Relations 
between the various actors (care recipient, formal and 
informal caregiver) are also altered by the use of technology. 
However, most studies that assess the use of technology in 
LTC are still based on pilot programs; further assessment of 
these programs is needed to understand the main findings 
and possibly enlarge their scope of application.3
This point is confirmed by Mazzeo et al,50 who looked 
at initiatives to support development and diffusion of 
technology to improve LTC quality. In Italy, for example, 
the Telemedicine/e-Health services comprise of 80 projects 
spread throughout the country. There is, however, no national 
strategic plan for telemedicine or e-Health. There are also no 
payment mechanisms that stimulate the use of telemedicine 
services. In the Netherlands, Telecare services that consist of 
a 24/7 television contact between the patient and the medical 
center, started as a regional program. 
To facilitate the diffusion of technology, there is a need to 
address infrastructural readiness, investment costs,51 and 
resistance to change by LTC workers.52 Mori et al49 identified 
barriers to implementing technological innovation in 
LTC: organizational inertia, barriers related to privacy and 
security, the lack of coherence with the regulatory system, 
and the issue of data management accountability. However, 
technological help has often been perceived in LTC as a 
complement to the labor workforce, rather than a substitute.53 
A recent multicenter study in England found that the gains of 
people using telehealth in addition to standard support and 
treatment were small or similar to those receiving usual care, 
and that the total costs for the telehealth group were higher 
than for the usual care group.54-56 
To date, there is still little evidence about persistent 
productivity improvements in LTC. Dumaij57 offered an 
interesting overview of productivity developments in Dutch 
nursing homes, residential homes, and home care, between 
1972 and 2010, that focused on the effects of policy changes 
on LTC productivity. This empirical analysis found that the 
change in funding system in the LTC sector — from a fixed 
fee per bed/patient to performance-oriented funding — 
did little to increase overall productivity. This could partly 
be a consequence of increasing case-mix levels that are not 
adequately adjusted for.57
In conclusion, effective technical tools to improve 
productivity in LTC do not yet appear to be available. It is 
difficult to substitute labor for capital. Most of the innovations 
developed in the past years to stimulate productivity were 
targeted at nursing- and home care. These included home 
care technology; tools for mobility; social monitoring; the 
development of many new types of small-scale residential 
care homes; collaborations between volunteers and informal 
care; self-steering teams; and smart planning and work 
processes.57 According to Mori et al,49 the phenomenon of 
technology-assisted LTC is still in its infancy, mostly because 
industry involvement is still largely underdeveloped, due to 
the inadequacy of the highly fragmented demand side. 
Discussion
The aging of the population, the increasing shortage of 
informal care, the substantial market failures for private 
funding of LTC, as well as fiscal imbalances in some countries, 
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have led to enduring pressures for LTC policy-makers across 
the EU. Greater productivity through technology or process 
innovation might be the most attractive solution, since 
decreasing unit costs enable the avoidance of difficult political 
decisions about cutting the level of publicly funded services. 
While increasing productivity with the aid of technical 
facilities or incentives (market-based or otherwise) may 
be politically attractive, the actual implementation of such 
strategies is difficult, and may sometimes, in fact, increase 
costs. Key challenges — community care, assisted living 
technologies, support of informal workers, and mobilizing 
volunteerism in nursing homes — can all be stimulated with 
cash benefits, but these come with complex design issues. 
When prefunding is needed, such as for ICT investments, 
central funding often remains necessary. 
Although there are still possibilities for stimulating informal 
care (e.g. cash allowances, respite care, support services, 
leave from work), the cost-effectiveness of such measures 
is not always clear. It is extremely important to find ways 
to stimulate informal care. This is very much about finding 
affordable ways to build ‘affectionate’ communities, and in 
supporting families in helping each other. However, many 
countries already heavily rely on informal care workers, and 
it is hard to see how informal care can accommodate rising 
demand without some negative consequences. Taking people 
(predominantly women) out of the workforce not only reduces 
tax revenue from earned income, but also increases their 
long-term risk for financial dependence on the government. 
The boundaries of LTC and other sectors, such as social care, 
housing, social security (pensions), and acute healthcare, 
are often somewhat blurred. Elderly people are entitled to 
multiple public services, which might offer opportunities to 
shift costs to neighboring policy areas. It also makes LTC 
systems vulnerable to a never-ending number of policy 
reforms intended to increase the efficiencies of scope between 
the different sectors. For example, the Netherlands witnessed 
a new reform (shifting parts of LTC to the more competitive 
arrangements of acute care and other parts to social care in 
the municipalities) that left a much smaller inpatient sector as 
the core of public insurance for LTC.30,44,58
An increase in private funding (including self-funding) is 
potentially a substantial source for future LTC spending. 
However, this option is not per se feasible. Solutions differ by 
country and require further development. Due to the market 
failures of private insurance and savings policies, it would 
be appropriate for a government to step in and arrange, for 
example, tax credits to build a minimum scale. Tax credits 
might persuade those who can afford such products to 
contribute some personal resources. However, this only 
contributes to financial sustainability if these tax benefits 
are ‘repaid’ through either fewer publicly funded benefits 
or, as an alternative, higher means testing (such policies will 
probably become disproportionally bought by higher income 
people). Currently, many LTC systems substantially rely on 
private self-funding. Means testing is often used to cover for a 
substantial share of the necessary public resources. However, 
this is often an unattractive deal for wealthier people, who 
share a large chunk of the financial burden for comparatively 
moderate service levels. 
The trade-off between comprehensive services for the most 
needy and a limited service provision for the middle-class 
seems to be one of the major issues when LTC systems come 
under increasing fiscal pressures. The political unpopularity 
of such strategies can be illustrated with the case in England, 
where means testing now comes with proposals for a 
threshold on cost-sharing. Policy-makers in countries with 
underfunded LTC services could contemplate a system of 
limited cash benefits to stimulate patient-specific choices and 
fill gaps, as in Italy. 
Conclusion
Our exploration shows that for LTC to be sustainable in 
the long run, important steps must be taken. First, private 
LTC insurance forms only a partial solution for a minority 
of the population, and must be complemented with public 
programs. EU countries should look into the possibilities 
of complementing public- and private funding, and address 
the market failures of private funding. Second, informal care 
is essential in elderly care, but it needs to anticipate societal 
changes, such as greater female labor market participation. 
Policies should be aimed at maximizing the informal care 
reservoir, while addressing potential negative consequences 
in order to avoid even greater fiscal imbalances. Informal 
care’s externalities into the broader labor force and LTC’s 
externalities into neighboring policy areas, such as social 
care, housing, and social security (pensions) should be 
considered and properly addressed. Third, increasing LTC 
productivity through technology or process innovation is 
a major challenge. Innovations to increase the efficiency of 
LTC services should be stimulated, especially if they coincide 
with lower costs. A promising approach is to consolidate the 
fragmented demand side. 
Our exploration of national policies illustrates a differing 
landscape of solutions that circle around fairness and 
stimulating efficient service delivery. Our analysis found that 
the complexity of the challenges offers no easy answers. The 
analysis shows the difficulty for EU Member State governments 
to meet all their goals for sustainable LTC, given the 
demographic and fiscal circumstances and the complexities of 
LTC systems. It also shows the usefulness to learn from policy 
design and implementation of LTC policy in other countries 
within and outside the EU. Without in-depth theoretical- 
and practical guidance, years of potentially unfruitful policy 
experimentation might lay ahead. Researchers can contribute 
by studying conditions, under which the strategies explored 
might deliver solutions for policy-makers.
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